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ROBERT H. GoRsKE*
The commentary by Reuben Hedlund and Deborah Paskin' on my article,
"An Arbitrator Looks at Expediting the Large, Complex Case, " ' appears
generally positive and approves most of the procedures and approaches
employed by the arbitrators in the immense case in question. However, as
to the arbitrator's approach to discovery and possible settlement, Mr.
Hedlund and Ms. Paskin are somewhat more critical. I feel compelled to
give some rejoinder.
On the very important matter of discovery in arbitration, Mr. Hedlund,
Ms. Paskin, and I are, it seems, in general agreement on basic principles that
I believe can be fairly summarized as follows: a principal virtue of
arbitration is its informality, which minimizes costs by avoiding or limiting
many of the potentially time-consuming and burdensome procedures that have
grown up in and around courtroom litigation. Discovery is one such
procedure; it is expensive, time-consuming, divisive and often subject to
abuse. In arbitration, discovery should be avoided, where possible, or held
to a minimum -- especially in cases in which both sides have access to a great
deal of basic information. This appears to be the conventional view with
which I am in full agreement.
I nonetheless believe that defense counsel's criticism of the arbitrators'
"liberal" discovery approach in this case is misplaced. In determining to take
a liberal approach to discovery in a case in which, in the words of Mr.
Hedlund and Ms. Paskin, "both parties had tons of information available in
their own files, and had equal resources, and sophistication, "' the arbitrators
did not perceive that they had "sent an open invitation to counsel to crank up
* Robert H. Gorske holds A.B. (cum laude, 1953) and J.D. (magna cum laude, 1955)
degrees from Marquette University and an LL.M. degree (1959) from the University of
Michigan, where he was a W.W. Cook Fellow and a member of the law school faculty. He is
general counsel of Wisconsin Energy Corp. and vice president and general counsel of Wisconsin
Electric Power Co. of Milwaukee. He is also a former partner in the Milwaukee law firm of
Quarles & Brady. Mr. Gorske has been involved in arbitration matters as counsel.and as an
arbitrator since 1956.
1. Hedlund & Paskin, Another View of Expediting the Large, Complex Case: A Response
to Arbitrator Gorskefiom Counsel for the Defense, 6 OHIO ST. J. ON Dis. RES. 61 (1990).
2. Gorske, An Arbitrator Looks at Expediting the Large, Complex Case, 5 OHmO ST. J. ON
Dis. Ras. 381 (1990).
3. Hedlund & Paskin, supra note 1, at 61.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
the discovery machine. "" On the contrary, because of the availability to both
sides of great amounts of information, equal resources and equal
sophistication, the arbitrators assumed that discovery would be used
judiciously and economically by the parties and would be tailored to meet
their needs for information. The arbitrators also assumed that if one party
desired a more comprehensive approach to discovery to obtain necessary
information and was willing to incur the additional expense, its decision
deserved at least some deference from the arbitrators - especially in view of
the obvious capacity and resources for retaliation available to each party in
the event of perceived abuse or harassment.
The discovery in the case was closely supervised by the arbitrators on
those numerous occasions in which that supervision was requested. Decisions
on the many discovery issues raised were typically issued by telefax within
hours of their submission. The arbitrators were constantly sensitive to the
potential for abuse and harassment and were not tolerant of that kind of
conduct, when demonstrated, even to the extent of imposing sanctions in the
final award. However, the most significant discovery objections raised were
those based on privilege, attorney work product, and similar law-oriented
objections (as opposed to fact-oriented claims such as burdensomeness). As
to these law-related objections, the arbitrators took a liberal approach,
favoring discovery while giving due respect to the policies underlying the
relevant legal principles. Objections based on alleged burdensomeness or
harassment were rare occurrences in the proceeding, and even rarer was such
an objection supported by contrasting the estimated cost of compliance with
the presumed benefits to the other side of production of the requested
information. Indeed, the format of the sometimes broad-scaled discovery
approaches taken by both parties appeared to place the greater burden on the
party requesting the discovery (who had to go to the considerable expense of
digesting and processing the materials produced) and the lesser burden upon
the other party (who merely had to assemble and produce the requested
materials).
The discovery process produced numerous documents that were presented
by the parties as exhibits -- some being of considerable interest to the
arbitrators. In fact, the arbitrators are of the view that the exigencies of the
case were such that discovery of much of the material in question would
inevitably have been required in any event. Even if the arbitrators had
expressed the intent at the outset of the case to take a generally restrictive
approach to discovery, there is no doubt in my mind that fairness would have
required much (though, perhaps not all) of the discovery in the case.
4. Id. at 71.
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Contrary to the opinion of Mr. Hedlund and Ms. Paskin, my perception
is that discovery was not "used to frame the issues"' in the case. The
principal issues resolved in the award were almost precisely the limited
number of issues set out by the parties two and one-half years earlier in their
preliminary statements. Discovery appeared to influence the evidence
presented (which, by itself, suggests the discovery's appropriateness) without
significantly prolonging the hearing itself, except insofar as it provided a
basis for challenge by one party to the evidentiary representations of the
other. In this connection it should be noted that it took seventeen months
(seventy-four hearing days) for presentation of the principal claimant's direct
case, a large portion of which was taken up by extensive and comprehensive
cross-examination. Had it been necessary to conduct discovery in preparation
for cross-examination during the hearing itself, and in the course of cross-
examination, I have no doubt that the total hearing would have been
considerably more protracted. Nor could that protraction have been avoided
by the simple expedient of setting rigid time limits. The amounts seriously
in controversy were so great, and the factual presentations so complex and
compartmentalized, that fairness could not have been accomplished through
any process that imposed early time restraints either on the direct presentation
or on cross-examination. The arbitrators simply had no reliable way of
determining what restraints could reasonably be imposed without improperly
impeding the fair presentation of the basic evidence. Time restraints were
determined to be appropriate later in the case (when the arbitrators knew
enough about the evidence to make a defensible decision), and were, in fact,
profitably imposed.
Would this case have taken significantly longer and cost significantly more
had it been fully handled in the court system? Based upon their undeniably
extensive and very relevant experience, Mr. Hedlund and Ms. Paskin do not
think so, and even express surprise that the case did not take longer than they
estimate it would have in court. Based on my own experience in protracted
cases involving similar issues in administrative tribunals and my own
experience in civil litigation, I am still of the opinion that, in the final
analysis, the process (expensive and harrowing though it was) did save both
parties time and money. We will never definitively know whose impression
is more accurate, but I am intrigued by the experience of the parties to the
various court and administrative agency disputes involved in the South Texas
Project nuclear litigation.' Those disputes were going on at the same time as
our arbitration and, in some respects, bore considerable similaritS, to the
5. Id.
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disputes in our case. According to reports, the cost to the parties involved,
in terms of money, time, and other resources, has been nothing short of
enormous, and has to date amounted to many times the very large cost
burdens sustained by the parties in our case.'
As far as the matter of the arbitrators' role in settlement is concerned, I
read defense counsel's commentary as suggesting that the arbitrators would
have been more helpful in this area if they had given some preliminary
indication at the hearing of their views about which side was more likely
correct on specific issues of fact and law. I am sure both parties would have
found that approach of great interest and, probably, unsettling. But the
arbitrators see this somewhat differently: their view is that determinations
should not be made until an issue has been fully heard and that an open mind
should be retained until it is clear that both sides' positions and arguments
have been fully and fairly heard. Indicating at some early or middle stage of
the proceeding which way the arbitrators are leaning would, at a minimum,
create an impression of prejudgment and, worse yet, might have untoward
and unintended results in influencing the future presentation of evidence (to
the possible prejudice of a party who may have misread that indication).
Furthermore, an indication of even a preliminary determination would tend
to fix that determination, since arbitrators do not want to appear mercurial or
indecisive. In any case, withholding judgment until an appropriate time is
sometimes quite difficult, but is a part of the essence of fairness and equity
in any kind of contested proceeding. Additionally, I believe that the position
of an arbitrator, in this respect, is different from that of a judge in civil
litigation in that the opportunity for appeal is much more limited in
arbitration, with perhaps a greater consequent need to avoid premature
determinations.
As to the lack of success of the mini-trial suggested by the arbitrators, I do
not believe that failure of the parties to settle can be convincingly attributed
to the fact that the mini-trial took place after the arbitration hearing had begun
and the parties' positions had hardened. After all, many cases -- especially
important and complex ones and, particularly, ones of sufficient
unpredictability to cause experienced and competent counsel "some sleepless
nights right to the end"' -- are settled during the course of trial, before the
jury returns its verdict, or even after an appeal is taken. There is, however,
at least one other element to be considered. In cases in which the parties
have difficulty in getting along with each other and in which there are
powerful political considerations, it is extremely desirable to have a mutually
7. Id. at 7, 11-12. See also Houston Lighting & Power Co. seeks $65 million for legal tab,
Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1989, at B8, col. 4 (Legal Beat).
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accepted and respected neutral to facilitate the discussions, to focus the
parties on the relevant issues, to keep the parties physically together, to help
them to assess their respective positions, and to counteract some of the
inevitable extraneous influences that often conspire to prevent compromise by
the parties. The parties here did not use a neutral. It may well have made
a difference.
While not taking credit as "one of the principal architects"9 of the Rules
and Commentary issued by the Center for Public Resources (CPR), I
nevertheless share the enthusiasm of Mr. Hedlund and Ms. Paskin for the
CPR Rules.
Finally, to the credit of the arbitration process itself, it bears repeating
that the fact that, through arbitration, this extremely significant, and
enormously complex, case could be resolved completely, expeditiously, and
to the expressed satisfaction of both parties is, I think, truly remarkable. I
and my fellow arbitrators, Jay Halverson and Louis Rubino, are very pleased
to have been participants in the process.
9. Id. at 63. Mr. Hedlund and Ms. Paskin give me rather too much credit in describing
me as "one of the principal architects" of the Rules and Commentary for the Non-Ad-ministered
Arbitration of Business Disputes issued by the Center for Public Resources following conclusion
of the ease in question. While I was a member of the CPR committee and did indeed participate
in its work on the Rules and Commentary, and while some of the procedural problems
encountered during the case did have a considerable influence on the discussions leading to the
Rules and Commentary, much more of the credit for the final product belongs to Gerald Aksen
of Reid & Priest, chairman of the committee; Peter Kaskell, CPR Senior Vice President; Robert
von Mehren of Debevoise & Plimpton; and other members of the committee who made
significant contributions.

